The National Assembly and the People's Councils in supervising the exercise of executive power in Laos

PRISA NOIMANY
PhD student at Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics

1. The primary entities exercising executive power in Laos are the Government and local administrative committees, with policy formulation and implementation being the most common executive activities. Therefore, it is essential for the National Assembly to oversee these activities.

According to the Constitution, the National Assembly performs supreme oversight of executive power through the following activities:

Firstly, the National Assembly has the authority to annul legal documents issued by the Government or the Prime Minister that are contrary to the Constitution, laws, or National Assembly resolutions. In exercising this power, the National Assembly can annul either partially or wholly any legal document issued by the Government or the Prime Minister that contradicts the Constitution, laws, or National Assembly resolutions.

Secondly, the National Assembly reviews the responses to questions posed to the Prime Minister, ministers, and other government members. In this capacity, National Assembly members have the right to demand that the questioned officials answer and clarify issues related to their responsibilities in implementing the Constitution, laws, and National Assembly resolutions. National Assembly members can propose that the Assembly consider the accountability of the questioned individuals. The National Assembly can adopt a resolution regarding the responses to questions and the accountability of the questioned individuals if deemed necessary.

Thirdly, the National Assembly votes on confidence, dismissal, and removal of the Prime Minister, ministers, and other government members. If a person subjected to a vote of confidence does not receive more than half of the total votes of the National Assembly members, the agency or person who proposed the election or nomination of that individual is responsible for presenting to the National Assembly the issue of their dismissal, removal, or approval of their dismissal or removal.

Additionally, according to the Constitution, the Lao National Assembly exercises oversight of executive power through two basic forms: reviewing and evaluating government reports and monitoring legal documents issued by the Government and the Prime Minister. Regarding the first form, despite many efforts by the National Assembly, the review and evaluation of government reports have not been highly effective recently. This ineffectiveness is reflected in several aspects, including:

Firstly, oversight mainly involves listening to reports read in the assembly chamber, with very few National Assembly members engaging in practical investigations or analyzing issues to identify their causes. Consequently, it is difficult to hold organizations or individuals accountable for deficiencies and problems. As a result, oversight recommendations are often general, vague, and lacking in feasibility, failing to adequately address the public’s concerns.

Secondly, the effectiveness of oversight actions is low, and the penalties are not strong enough. In practice, even though some areas are heavily monitored and questioned, corrective actions are implemented very slowly. However, the entities exercising executive power do not face any penalties or accountability, leading to delays in addressing limitations and shortcomings.

Thirdly, oversight activities are often reactive, meaning they only occur after issues have arisen, sometimes only when they become pressing social problems. This is contrary to the essence of oversight, which is intended to prevent potential violations before they occur, rather than addressing issues only after they have already happened.

Oversight of the exercise of executive power involves state agencies, social organizations, and citizens using necessary measures and methods to prevent and eliminate abuses and overreach by state agencies in the exercise of executive authority. This ensures that executive power is exercised in accordance with the Constitution and laws.

In terms of oversight of executive power, through monitoring government and Prime Ministerial documents (also known as constitutional oversight), there are some limitations that need to be addressed in the future. According to current legal regulations, reviewing legal documents that appear to be inconsistent with the Constitution, laws, or National Assembly resolutions is a special form of oversight exercised by the National Assembly. Through this, the National Assembly carries out activities such as reviewing, inspecting, detecting, discussing, and recommending the suspension or annulment of legal documents issued by the Government, the Prime Minister, or intergovernmental resolutions between the Government and the Presidium of the Lao Front for National Construction, which show signs of being contrary to the Constitution, laws, National Assembly resolutions, ordinances, or resolutions of the National Assembly Standing Committee. However, to date, the Lao National Assembly has never implemented this form of oversight over legal documents. This situation indicates that this area of activity is relatively underdeveloped in the Lao National Assembly.

2. Current situation of the People’s Councils in overseeing the exercise of executive power in Laos

The People’s Councils were officially recognized for the first time in the history of constitutional law in the 2015 Lao Constitution. This is considered a significant milestone in the process of refining the state apparatus in general and local government in Laos in particular. Since the declaration of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (in 1975), the highest state power organs in Laos had only been established at the central level, including the legislative body (the National Assembly), the executive body (the Government), and the judiciary (the Supreme People’s Prosecutor and the Supreme People’s Court). Local government had been granted many powers and focused on the role of provincial governors as the heads of local administration. This distribution of power led to a local government mechanism that was accountable to the superior administrative authorities and directly responsible to the National Assembly.

The Central Committee Resolution No. 3 of the 10th Congress in 2015 on strengthening and improving the quality and effectiveness of the National Assembly highlighted the need to enhance the performance of the National Assembly and increase its oversight of local administrative agencies. This aims to ensure that all state policies and laws adhere to the Party’s guidelines, principles, and policies, and are based on the legitimate aspirations, rights, and interests of the people. The resolution also advocated for the establishment of local People’s Councils to further refine the administration of local government.

Based on the Party’s platforms and guidelines, the 2015 Constitution of Laos concretized this into the provisions of Article 76, which states: “The local People’s Council is the representative body of the rights and interests of the ethnic groups; it is the highest authority of local government, performing the role of reviewing [and] approving important laws, making decisions on fundamental issues at the local level, and overseeing the activities of all state organizations under its jurisdiction as prescribed by law. The local People’s Councils are established at administrative levels, including provincial, district, and village (ban) levels. The National Assembly decides on the establishment of district and village People’s Councils.”

The People’s Councils perform the function of overseeing the activities of all state organizations within their jurisdiction. Provincial People’s Council members have the right to question provincial governors, municipal mayors (of Vientiane), directors of provincial departments or equivalent organizations, municipal mayors, city heads, heads of local prosecutorial offices, local court chief justices, and relevant representatives from regional state audit offices. Those questioned must respond either verbally or in writing at the provincial People’s Council sessions.

With the constitutional establishment of local People’s Councils at the provincial level, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic has initially formed a mechanism for state power to oversee local administrative agencies. To date, local People’s Councils have been established in 18 provinces and municipalities in Laos, including: Vientiane Capital, Phongsaly Province, Luangnamtha Province, Oudomxay Province, Bokeo Province, Luang Prabang Province, Huaphan Province, Xayabury Province, Xieng Khouang Province, Vientiane Province, Borikhamxay Province, Khammouane Province, Savannakhet Province, Saravan Province, Sekong Province, Champasack Province, Attapeu Province, and Xaisomboun Province. However, the 2015 Lao Constitution only specifies the functions and duties of the provincial People’s Councils and does not yet define the powers and responsibilities of the district and village People’s Councils.

Since the People’s Councils at the provincial level in Laos are newly established, despite their efforts to fulfill their roles and functions, particularly in overseeing the exercise of executive power, there are still significant limitations and challenges. The 11th Congress of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party pointed out that “the effectiveness of oversight and social criticism regarding the development and implementation of laws and policies remains low”.

The People’s Councils at the district and village levels have not yet been established. As a result, the provincial People’s Councils currently have a broad scope of oversight responsibilities. In addition to monitoring provincial agencies, provincial People’s Councils are also tasked with overseeing the District People’s Committees, District Courts, and District Prosecutor’s Offices - areas where People’s Councils are not organized. It is noteworthy that the National Assembly Standing Committee has not issued regulations on the methods and forms of oversight by provincial People’s Councils over subordinate entities, which has led to difficulties in executing their tasks. The review of reports, votes of confidence, questioning, and responding to questions have been particularly problematic, with some activities not being carried out effectively.

The monitoring delegations of the provincial People’s Councils carry out their oversight function by studying reports and then issuing monitoring results reports. However, this oversight process has many limitations, often only addressing issues when they become particularly prominent or urgent. Many recommendations from the monitoring delegations have not met the required standards due to a lack of alignment with practical realities. The absence of People’s Councils at the district and village levels represents a missed opportunity for democratic representation, a crucial platform for expressing the will and aspirations of the people and local organizations. This gap is a matter that needs further study and improvement in the future.

The effectiveness of the oversight of executive power by the People’s Councils depends significantly on the quality of the council members. Therefore, the competence of the People’s Council representatives is crucial, as it directly affects the quality and effectiveness of the council’s operations.

In practice, in many regions, the quality of People’s Council representatives depends on their experience and the alignment between standards and the composition of the representatives. This often results in a focus on composition rather than on standards, leading to situations where the quality of representatives does not meet the requirements, especially concerning their capabilities and qualifications.

Moreover, the proportion of full-time representatives in provincial People’s Councils is relatively low (around 15% of the total number of representatives), while a significant number of representatives also hold positions in state administrative agencies. This dual role-being both a member of the People’s Council and an administrative official-can limit the objectivity of their oversight and critical activities. Consequently, although oversight is a right of the representatives, very few (or even none) have independently organized activities to oversee the exercise of executive power by state agencies. These issues need to be addressed to ensure that local state power agencies fully perform their roles, functions, and responsibilities.

The primary entities exercising executive power in Laos are the Government and local administrative committees, with policy formulation and implementation being the most common executive activities. Therefore, it is essential for the National Assembly to oversee these activities.

According to the Constitution, the National Assembly performs supreme oversight of executive power through the following activities:

Firstly, the National Assembly has the authority to annul legal documents issued by the Government or the Prime Minister that are contrary to the Constitution, laws, or National Assembly resolutions. In exercising this power, the National Assembly can annul either partially or wholly any legal document issued by the Government or the Prime Minister that contradicts the Constitution, laws, or National Assembly resolutions.

Secondly, the National Assembly reviews the responses to questions posed to the Prime Minister, ministers, and other government members. In this capacity, National Assembly members have the right to demand that the questioned officials answer and clarify issues related to their responsibilities in implementing the Constitution, laws, and National Assembly resolutions. National Assembly members can propose that the Assembly consider the accountability of the questioned individuals. The National Assembly can adopt a resolution regarding the responses to questions and the accountability of the questioned individuals if deemed necessary.

Thirdly, the National Assembly votes on confidence, dismissal, and removal of the Prime Minister, ministers, and other government members. If a person subjected to a vote of confidence does not receive more than half of the total votes of the National Assembly members, the agency or person who proposed the election or nomination of that individual is responsible for presenting to the National Assembly the issue of their dismissal, removal, or approval of their dismissal or removal.

Additionally, according to the Constitution, the Lao National Assembly exercises oversight of executive power through two basic forms: reviewing and evaluating government reports and monitoring legal documents issued by the Government and the Prime Minister. Regarding the first form, despite many efforts by the National Assembly, the review and evaluation of government reports have not been highly effective recently. This ineffectiveness is reflected in several aspects, including:

Firstly, oversight mainly involves listening to reports read in the assembly chamber, with very few National Assembly members engaging in practical investigations or analyzing issues to identify their causes. Consequently, it is difficult to hold organizations or individuals accountable for deficiencies and problems. As a result, oversight recommendations are often general, vague, and lacking in feasibility, failing to adequately address the public’s concerns.

Secondly, the effectiveness of oversight actions is low, and the penalties are not strong enough. In practice, even though some areas are heavily monitored and questioned, corrective actions are implemented very slowly. However, the entities exercising executive power do not face any penalties or accountability, leading to delays in addressing limitations and shortcomings.

Thirdly, oversight activities are often reactive, meaning they only occur after issues have arisen, sometimes only when they become pressing social problems. This is contrary to the essence of oversight, which is intended to prevent potential violations before they occur, rather than addressing issues only after they have already happened.

Oversight of the exercise of executive power involves state agencies, social organizations, and citizens using necessary measures and methods to prevent and eliminate abuses and overreach by state agencies in the exercise of executive authority. This ensures that executive power is exercised in accordance with the Constitution and laws.

In terms of oversight of executive power, through monitoring government and Prime Ministerial documents (also known as constitutional oversight), there are some limitations that need to be addressed in the future. According to current legal regulations, reviewing legal documents that appear to be inconsistent with the Constitution, laws, or National Assembly resolutions is a special form of oversight exercised by the National Assembly. Through this, the National Assembly carries out activities such as reviewing, inspecting, detecting, discussing, and recommending the suspension or annulment of legal documents issued by the Government, the Prime Minister, or intergovernmental resolutions between the Government and the Presidium of the Lao Front for National Construction, which show signs of being contrary to the Constitution, laws, National Assembly resolutions, ordinances, or resolutions of the National Assembly Standing Committee. However, to date, the Lao National Assembly has never implemented this form of oversight over legal documents. This situation indicates that this area of activity is relatively underdeveloped in the Lao National Assembly.

2. Current situation of the People’s Councils in overseeing the exercise of executive power in Laos

The People’s Councils were officially recognized for the first time in the history of constitutional law in the 2015 Lao Constitution. This is considered a significant milestone in the process of refining the state apparatus in general and local government in Laos in particular. Since the declaration of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (in 1975), the highest state power organs in Laos had only been established at the central level, including the legislative body (the National Assembly), the executive body (the Government), and the judiciary (the Supreme People’s Prosecutor and the Supreme People’s Court). Local government had been granted many powers and focused on the role of provincial governors as the heads of local administration. This distribution of power led to a local government mechanism that was accountable to the superior administrative authorities and directly responsible to the National Assembly.

The Central Committee Resolution No. 3 of the 10th Congress in 2015 on strengthening and improving the quality and effectiveness of the National Assembly highlighted the need to enhance the performance of the National Assembly and increase its oversight of local administrative agencies. This aims to ensure that all state policies and laws adhere to the Party’s guidelines, principles, and policies, and are based on the legitimate aspirations, rights, and interests of the people. The resolution also advocated for the establishment of local People’s Councils to further refine the administration of local government.

Based on the Party’s platforms and guidelines, the 2015 Constitution of Laos concretized this into the provisions of Article 76, which states: “The local People’s Council is the representative body of the rights and interests of the ethnic groups; it is the highest authority of local government, performing the role of reviewing [and] approving important laws, making decisions on fundamental issues at the local level, and overseeing the activities of all state organizations under its jurisdiction as prescribed by law. The local People’s Councils are established at administrative levels, including provincial, district, and village (ban) levels. The National Assembly decides on the establishment of district and village People’s Councils.”

The People’s Councils perform the function of overseeing the activities of all state organizations within their jurisdiction. Provincial People’s Council members have the right to question provincial governors, municipal mayors (of Vientiane), directors of provincial departments or equivalent organizations, municipal mayors, city heads, heads of local prosecutorial offices, local court chief justices, and relevant representatives from regional state audit offices. Those questioned must respond either verbally or in writing at the provincial People’s Council sessions.

With the constitutional establishment of local People’s Councils at the provincial level, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic has initially formed a mechanism for state power to oversee local administrative agencies. To date, local People’s Councils have been established in 18 provinces and municipalities in Laos, including: Vientiane Capital, Phongsaly Province, Luangnamtha Province, Oudomxay Province, Bokeo Province, Luang Prabang Province, Huaphan Province, Xayabury Province, Xieng Khouang Province, Vientiane Province, Borikhamxay Province, Khammouane Province, Savannakhet Province, Saravan Province, Sekong Province, Champasack Province, Attapeu Province, and Xaisomboun Province. However, the 2015 Lao Constitution only specifies the functions and duties of the provincial People’s Councils and does not yet define the powers and responsibilities of the district and village People’s Councils.

Since the People’s Councils at the provincial level in Laos are newly established, despite their efforts to fulfill their roles and functions, particularly in overseeing the exercise of executive power, there are still significant limitations and challenges. The 11th Congress of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party pointed out that “the effectiveness of oversight and social criticism regarding the development and implementation of laws and policies remains low”.

The People’s Councils at the district and village levels have not yet been established. As a result, the provincial People’s Councils currently have a broad scope of oversight responsibilities. In addition to monitoring provincial agencies, provincial People’s Councils are also tasked with overseeing the District People’s Committees, District Courts, and District Prosecutor’s Offices - areas where People’s Councils are not organized. It is noteworthy that the National Assembly Standing Committee has not issued regulations on the methods and forms of oversight by provincial People’s Councils over subordinate entities, which has led to difficulties in executing their tasks. The review of reports, votes of confidence, questioning, and responding to questions have been particularly problematic, with some activities not being carried out effectively.

The monitoring delegations of the provincial People’s Councils carry out their oversight function by studying reports and then issuing monitoring results reports. However, this oversight process has many limitations, often only addressing issues when they become particularly prominent or urgent. Many recommendations from the monitoring delegations have not met the required standards due to a lack of alignment with practical realities. The absence of People’s Councils at the district and village levels represents a missed opportunity for democratic representation, a crucial platform for expressing the will and aspirations of the people and local organizations. This gap is a matter that needs further study and improvement in the future.

The effectiveness of the oversight of executive power by the People’s Councils depends significantly on the quality of the council members. Therefore, the competence of the People’s Council representatives is crucial, as it directly affects the quality and effectiveness of the council’s operations.

In practice, in many regions, the quality of People’s Council representatives depends on their experience and the alignment between standards and the composition of the representatives. This often results in a focus on composition rather than on standards, leading to situations where the quality of representatives does not meet the requirements, especially concerning their capabilities and qualifications.

Moreover, the proportion of full-time representatives in provincial People’s Councils is relatively low (around 15% of the total number of representatives), while a significant number of representatives also hold positions in state administrative agencies. This dual role-being both a member of the People’s Council and an administrative official-can limit the objectivity of their oversight and critical activities. Consequently, although oversight is a right of the representatives, very few (or even none) have independently organized activities to oversee the exercise of executive power by state agencies. These issues need to be addressed to ensure that local state power agencies fully perform their roles, functions, and responsibilities.

3. Some solutions for the National Assembly and People’s Councils to enhance the effectiveness of their oversight of executive power

Firstly, enhancing the National Assembly’s effectiveness in overseeing the Government.

To enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of controlling the implementation of executive power, the National must innovate its operational methods to be more substantive. Accordingly, it is necessary to continue to innovate the questioning and answering activities at the National Assembly sessions, the National Assembly Standing Committee meetings, the explanation sessions held by the Council of Ethnic Affairs and other committees. These reforms should focus on increasing debate, analysis and clarifying the issues raised for questioning. These include improving the quality of consultation and support services for the questioning activities in order to reduce the administrative nature of the matter. Rather, it should focus on consulting and serving the National Assembly through its questioning activities, such as providing information to serve the management of questioning sessions, providing information and consulting to National Assembly deputies when exercising the right to question, drafting resolutions, and summaries of minutes of the responses to questions.

Enhancing thematic oversight and focusing on post-supervision activities are key priorities. The National Assembly should continue to organize more explanatory (hearing) sessions within the Council of Ethnic Affairs and other committees. It should also promote the leading role of committees in verifying, supervising, and evaluating economic, social, and state budget matters while fostering collaboration among the National Assembly’s agencies. Efforts must be made to establish mechanisms and policies for gathering a wide range of information to support supervision activities. This includes data from direct oversight bodies, experts, research institutions, and independent critiques to ensure the diversity, objectivity, and comprehensiveness of the information.

The decisive factor in the effectiveness of the National Assembly’s control of the implementation of executive power over the Government is the capacity and sense of responsibility of National Assembly deputies when carrying out this activity. Observations of recent Lao National Assembly sessions show that National Assembly deputies have not fully utilized their capacity and responsibility in controlling the implementation of executive power by the Government. In reality, most National Assembly deputies have not paid due attention to this task For instance, questioning sessions have not attracted widespread participation, with most questions coming from only a few dedicated deputies. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the professional qualifications, expertise, professionalism and responsibility of National Assembly deputies. To achieve this, the Lao National Assembly should expedite the enactment of an Election Law to ensure that candidates included in the electoral list possess integrity, capability, and a strong sense of responsibility. Additionally, after being elected, deputies should undergo training to develop their parliamentary skills in accordance with legal provisions on content and duration. Only then can the National Assembly’s oversight of the Government’s exercise of executive power be improved. The practical activities of the Lao National Assembly in recent times indicate that, despite the best efforts of the National Assembly and its deputies, the resources available for its operations and those of its committees remain inadequate. The organizational structure is insufficient to fully and quickly meet the requirements. To overcome this situation, along with improving the qualifications, capacity and qualities of the officials and civil servants of the National Assembly Office, it is necessary to strengthen the material facilities in the coming time to ensure that the National Assembly’s agencies operate more effectively.Secondly, enhancing the effectiveness of oversight of executive power by the People’s Councils

The National Assembly and its Standing Committee need to enact laws or decrees for the establishment of People’s Councils at the district and village levels. In this regard, Laos can learn from Vietnam’s experience with the enactment and implementation of the Local Government Organization Law. This law clearly outlines the organization of local government; depending on the characteristics of each specific locality, decisions are made on whether to establish People’s Councils at the district and village levels. If not established uniformly as is currently the case in Laos, it may lead to significant gaps in power control, especially in overseeing the exercise of executive power. Conversely, if all levels of People’s Councils are established without considering the specific conditions of each locality, it could result in the wastage of resource and increased fiscal burdens on the state budget.

From Vietnam’s experience, Laos can refer to the practice where urban localities, typically smaller in area compared to rural areas, with convenient transportation, or rural areas with large areas but small or moderate populations, may not necessarily require the establishment of People’s Councils. In such cases, the provincial People’s Council would carry out general oversight functions for local governments at all levels, including oversight of the executive power exercised by the People’s Committee. Conversely, localities lacking these characteristics would benefit from establishing People’s Councils at the district and village levels to ensure effective oversight of state power, reduce the workload for the provincial People’s Council, and maximize the people’s role in governance.

Laos might also consider Vietnam’s approach of distinguishing between the concepts of “local government” and “level of local government” as defined in the Constitution and the Local Government Organization Law. In Vietnam’s current understanding, local government refers to the collection of public authorities responsible for state and social management, maintaining order and economic development, and serving the people. Meanwhile, the level of local government refers to the organization comprising the People’s Council and the People’s Committee. Each administrative unit must have a local government but is not required to have a corresponding level of local government. Instead, it can have only a People’s Committee, led by a chairman, provincial governor, district chief, or mayor, without needing a corresponding People’s Council. The decision to establish a People’s Council depends on the specific characteristics of each locality as previously discussed. Referring to this, the National Assembly of Laos should consider amending and supplementing Articles 76 and 77 of the 2015 Constitution to include these two concepts as stipulated in Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution.

Additionally, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly should promptly issue guidelines for the general oversight functions and specifically for the oversight of executive power by the People’s Councils at all levels, creating a legal foundation for the People’s Councils to effectively perform their oversight functions overcoming the current practice of acting while seeking approval simultaneously. Special attention should be given to guiding People’s Council representatives on exercising their right to question representatives of executive agencies, overseeing documents issued by executive bodies, and organizing their implementation.

Received: June 30, 2024; Revised: July 5, 2024; Approved for Publication: August 19, 2024.

Endnotes:

(1) See Articles 76 and 77 of the Lao Constitution 2015.

(2) See Article 83 of the Lao Constitution 2015.

(3) Lao People’s Revolutionary Party: Documents of the 11th Congress of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, State Publishing House, Vientiane, 2021.

(4) See Articles 111 and 112 of the 2013 Vietnamese Constitution.

Firstly, enhancing the National Assembly’s effectiveness in overseeing the Government.

To enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of controlling the implementation of executive power, the National must innovate its operational methods to be more substantive. Accordingly, it is necessary to continue to innovate the questioning and answering activities at the National Assembly sessions, the National Assembly Standing Committee meetings, the explanation sessions held by the Council of Ethnic Affairs and other committees. These reforms should focus on increasing debate, analysis and clarifying the issues raised for questioning. These include improving the quality of consultation and support services for the questioning activities in order to reduce the administrative nature of the matter. Rather, it should focus on consulting and serving the National Assembly through its questioning activities, such as providing information to serve the management of questioning sessions, providing information and consulting to National Assembly deputies when exercising the right to question, drafting resolutions, and summaries of minutes of the responses to questions.

Enhancing thematic oversight and focusing on post-supervision activities are key priorities. The National Assembly should continue to organize more explanatory (hearing) sessions within the Council of Ethnic Affairs and other committees. It should also promote the leading role of committees in verifying, supervising, and evaluating economic, social, and state budget matters while fostering collaboration among the National Assembly’s agencies. Efforts must be made to establish mechanisms and policies for gathering a wide range of information to support supervision activities. This includes data from direct oversight bodies, experts, research institutions, and independent critiques to ensure the diversity, objectivity, and comprehensiveness of the information.

The decisive factor in the effectiveness of the National Assembly’s control of the implementation of executive power over the Government is the capacity and sense of responsibility of National Assembly deputies when carrying out this activity. Observations of recent Lao National Assembly sessions show that National Assembly deputies have not fully utilized their capacity and responsibility in controlling the implementation of executive power by the Government. In reality, most National Assembly deputies have not paid due attention to this task For instance, questioning sessions have not attracted widespread participation, with most questions coming from only a few dedicated deputies. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the professional qualifications, expertise, professionalism and responsibility of National Assembly deputies. To achieve this, the Lao National Assembly should expedite the enactment of an Election Law to ensure that candidates included in the electoral list possess integrity, capability, and a strong sense of responsibility. Additionally, after being elected, deputies should undergo training to develop their parliamentary skills in accordance with legal provisions on content and duration. Only then can the National Assembly’s oversight of the Government’s exercise of executive power be improved. The practical activities of the Lao National Assembly in recent times indicate that, despite the best efforts of the National Assembly and its deputies, the resources available for its operations and those of its committees remain inadequate. The organizational structure is insufficient to fully and quickly meet the requirements. To overcome this situation, along with improving the qualifications, capacity and qualities of the officials and civil servants of the National Assembly Office, it is necessary to strengthen the material facilities in the coming time to ensure that the National Assembly’s agencies operate more effectively.Secondly, enhancing the effectiveness of oversight of executive power by the People’s Councils

The National Assembly and its Standing Committee need to enact laws or decrees for the establishment of People’s Councils at the district and village levels. In this regard, Laos can learn from Vietnam’s experience with the enactment and implementation of the Local Government Organization Law. This law clearly outlines the organization of local government; depending on the characteristics of each specific locality, decisions are made on whether to establish People’s Councils at the district and village levels. If not established uniformly as is currently the case in Laos, it may lead to significant gaps in power control, especially in overseeing the exercise of executive power. Conversely, if all levels of People’s Councils are established without considering the specific conditions of each locality, it could result in the wastage of resource and increased fiscal burdens on the state budget.

From Vietnam’s experience, Laos can refer to the practice where urban localities, typically smaller in area compared to rural areas, with convenient transportation, or rural areas with large areas but small or moderate populations, may not necessarily require the establishment of People’s Councils. In such cases, the provincial People’s Council would carry out general oversight functions for local governments at all levels, including oversight of the executive power exercised by the People’s Committee. Conversely, localities lacking these characteristics would benefit from establishing People’s Councils at the district and village levels to ensure effective oversight of state power, reduce the workload for the provincial People’s Council, and maximize the people’s role in governance.

Laos might also consider Vietnam’s approach of distinguishing between the concepts of “local government” and “level of local government” as defined in the Constitution and the Local Government Organization Law. In Vietnam’s current understanding, local government refers to the collection of public authorities responsible for state and social management, maintaining order and economic development, and serving the people. Meanwhile, the level of local government refers to the organization comprising the People’s Council and the People’s Committee. Each administrative unit must have a local government but is not required to have a corresponding level of local government. Instead, it can have only a People’s Committee, led by a chairman, provincial governor, district chief, or mayor, without needing a corresponding People’s Council. The decision to establish a People’s Council depends on the specific characteristics of each locality as previously discussed. Referring to this, the National Assembly of Laos should consider amending and supplementing Articles 76 and 77 of the 2015 Constitution to include these two concepts as stipulated in Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution.

Additionally, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly should promptly issue guidelines for the general oversight functions and specifically for the oversight of executive power by the People’s Councils at all levels, creating a legal foundation for the People’s Councils to effectively perform their oversight functions overcoming the current practice of acting while seeking approval simultaneously. Special attention should be given to guiding People’s Council representatives on exercising their right to question representatives of executive agencies, overseeing documents issued by executive bodies, and organizing their implementation.

Received: June 30, 2024; Revised: July 5, 2024; Approved for Publication: August 19, 2024.

Endnotes:

(1) See Articles 76 and 77 of the Lao Constitution 2015.

(2) See Article 83 of the Lao Constitution 2015.

(3) Lao People’s Revolutionary Party: Documents of the 11th Congress of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, State Publishing House, Vientiane, 2021.

(4) See Articles 111 and 112 of the 2013 Vietnamese Constitution.